Wednesday 4 March 2015

Week 8: PREVENT and counter-radicalisation

Since 2003 - and publicly since 2006 - the government has been running a programme designed to reduce the danger of terrorism by preventing 'radicalisation': PREVENT.

There's an obvious problem in the basic approach of PREVENT: there's a difference between becoming a 'radical' and becoming a terrorist, and only one of these is something that the government should be trying to stop. If the government wants to stop people becoming terrorists, what they need to stop is that specific step in the process of 'radicalisation' which takes people into actual terrorist involvement. This step is, of course, fiendishly difficult to identify, and takes different forms for different people; the entire broad process of 'radicalisation' (meaning 'becoming more radical') is much easier to combat. The problem is that if you make it a government priority to prevent people becoming more radical, you're committing the government to opposing certain political views, whether the people holding them are violent or not.

The government essentially has two impossible options: one target which is too small to hit and takes too many different forms to define consistently, and one which it can hit but shouldn't. Attacking an entire sub-culture with 'radical' views is a bad idea, ethically speaking - a democratic government shouldn't be in the business of banning certain forms of politics. It's also bad tactics. Say you've identified 500 people with more or less jihadist views, including 10 who are actually planning a terrorist action and 40 active sympathisers. In that scenario, putting the 450 people under intensive surveillance is at best a waste of resources; at worst, it will cause enough alienation to turn some of those people into active sympathisers, making the original problem worse.

The problem with PREVENT was summed up in the first published document on the strategy, which defined 'radicalisation' as "The processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances". Although 'radicalisation' literally means 'becoming radicalised', it's also defined as "becom[ing] radicalised to the extent of turning to violence".

Things didn't get much better in the second iteration of PREVENT, announced in 2009. Now what was at issue wasn't 'radicalisation' (always an under-defined term) but 'violent extremism'. The assumption was that it was possible to draw a line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of radicalism, the unacceptable kinds being inherently (and recognisably) 'violent' in themselves. Since this is in fact impossible, there was widespread suspicion of PREVENT in this period, precisely on the grounds that the fear of 'violent extremism' was having a chilling effect on free speech. In the same period, ironically, some PREVENT-funded projects were focusing - or attempting to focus - on the specific stage in the process of radicalisation which leads into violent activism. This necessarily meant that some official funding was going to people with radical - and in some cases quite unpleasant - views: if you want to stop radicals turning into terrorists, the people you want to work with are the radicals.

The Coalition government announced a third version of PREVENT in 2011, responding to two different sets of concerns. On one hand, the 'violent extremism' narrative was abandoned; a definite line was drawn between radical views, on one hand, and support for terrorism on the other. On the other hand, earlier versions of PREVENT were heavily criticised for channelling public money to (non-violent) extremists, and connections were drawn between 'extremist ideologies' and support for terrorism. In other words, we rapidly went back to square one: the idea of opposing terrorism while tolerating radicalism effectively disappeared, with Prime Ministerial statements to the effect that PREVENT should oppose extremism in all forms, violent or not.

Throughout the brief history of PREVENT, two things have been constant: the aim (influencing people not to become terrorists) and the means (an attack on radical ideas). The greatest irony of this tangled and unedifying story is how little it corresponds to what we know about desistance from crime. If you want to help career criminals to go straight, the research suggests that the best thing to do is help them to feel that they're redeeming themselves in the process - not making an enforced break with their past, but going straight of their own accord and with their heads held high. The last thing you do is tell them that their entire view of society is wrong and demand that they adopt the opposite of their existing views: the government is not a racket, the police are not bent, shoplifting is not a victimless crime, cannabis is not harmless... But according to the PREVENT approach, with its stress on getting people to abandon radical ideas, this is precisely how you get terrorists and terrorist sympathisers to 'go straight'.

Are terrorists that different from ordinary criminals? Is PREVENT really poorly designed? Or is the goal of PREVENT something other than preventing people becoming terrorists?